Hypothetical applied case
Banking Stability and Credit Cycles
When should supervisors respond to a credit boom before losses are visible?
Scenario
In the fictional economy of Northport, private credit rises from 85% to 112% of GDP in four years. House prices rise 35%, wholesale funding grows from 18% to 31% of bank liabilities, and the average common-equity-to-asset ratio is 6%. Reported nonperforming loans remain low. The task is to decide whether to activate a countercyclical capital buffer, tighten borrower-based measures, or wait.
Boundary: These figures are invented for instruction. They must not be cited as observations about a country or banking system.
Mechanism and arithmetic
Loss absorption: With assets of 100 and common equity of 6, an unprovisioned loss of 6 exhausts that simple accounting buffer. Regulatory capital ratios use risk-weighted assets and cannot be inferred from this example alone.
Liquidity: Solvency and liquidity are different. Runnable short-term funding can force asset sales before long-run loan losses are known.
Feedback: Credit and collateral prices can reinforce each other in a boom, then reverse together. Correlation does not reveal which shock starts the downturn.
Evidence dashboard
Decision task
Choose one action. State the trigger, the transmission channel, one false-positive cost, one distributional effect and the additional bank-level evidence needed. Do not treat low current defaults as proof that the boom is safe.
Sources and indicator note
- Basel Committee: countercyclical capital buffer
- BIS: credit-to-GDP gaps and countercyclical buffers
- World Bank indicator FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS
Domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP is a broad macro series. It is not a live supervisory measure and does not report loan quality, maturity, currency, collateral or bank capital. Sources checked 10 October 2026.